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NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
________________ 
 
No. 17-1695 
 
 
CARLOS ALBERTO PAREDES-RIVEROS, 
        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
        Respondent  
 
     ________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of a Final Order  
of the Board of Immigration Appeals 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg 
(No. A095-429-609) 
________________ 
 
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
November 13, 2017 
 
Before: AMBRO, KRAUSE, and RENDELL, Circuit Judges 
 
(Opinion filed: January 9, 2018) 
 
 
OPINION* 
________________ 
 
AMBRO, Circuit Judge 
 
                                              
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 
constitute binding precedent. 
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Carlos Paredes-Riveros, a native and citizen of Peru, petitions us to remand to the 
Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) his second motion to reopen his removal 
proceedings.  In March of 2009 an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) ordered Paredes removed to 
Peru after finding him ineligible for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection 
under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).  Paredes appealed, and the BIA 
affirmed.  Fifteen months later, he filed a motion to reopen his removal proceedings; the 
BIA denied that motion and entered its final order of removal.  Paredes petitioned us to 
review the BIA’s decision, and we dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.  Years later, in 
November of 2016, he filed a numerically barred and untimely motion with the BIA 
asking that it reopen his case on its own motion.  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(A) (“An alien 
may file one motion to reopen proceedings. . . .”); id. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(i) (“[T]he motion 
to reopen shall be filed within 90 days of the date of entry of a final administrative order 
of removal.”); 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a) (“[The BIA] may at any time reopen . . . on its own 
motion any case in which it has rendered a decision.”). 
Paredes sought sua sponte reopening so that he could apply for an adjustment of 
status under 8 U.S.C. § 1255(a) through his daughter, a recently naturalized U.S. citizen, 
and ask the Department of Homeland Security for a Terrorism-Related Inadmissibility 
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Grounds (“TRIG”) exemption.1  Based on allegedly changed conditions in Peru,2 he also 
sought reopening to reapply for asylum under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a), withholding of removal 
under 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3), and CAT protection.  The BIA denied the motion in its 
entirety.  In his petition for review, Paredes argues that the BIA erred by basing its 
decision not to reopen sua sponte on an incorrect legal premise and abused its discretion 
by failing to consider his arguments and evidence of changed conditions in Peru. 
The BIA had jurisdiction over Paredes’s motion to reopen under 
8 C.F.R. § 1003(2).  While we have jurisdiction over petitions for review of BIA final 
orders under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1), we have repeatedly held that “the BIA has 
‘unfettered discretion to decline to sua sponte reopen.’”  Chehazeh v. Att’y Gen., 666 
F.3d 118, 129 (3d Cir. 2012) (quoting Calle-Vujiles v. Ashcroft, 320 F.3d 472, 475 (3d 
Cir. 2003)).  Therefore, we generally cannot review its denial of sua sponte reopening.  
See Sang Goo Park v. Att’y Gen., 846 F.3d 645, 651 (3d Cir. 2017). 
One exception, argued in this petition, is if “the BIA relie[d] on an incorrect legal 
premise in denying [the] motion.”  Id.  That did not occur here.  The BIA found that even 
“if [Paredes were] granted [a TRIG] exemption,” his “[b]ecoming potentially eligible for 
                                              
1 Without a TRIG exemption, Paredes could not be eligible for an adjustment of status.  
Following his March 2009 hearing, the IJ found that he had provided material support to 
Shining Path, a designated foreign terrorist organization.  An alien who provides material 
support to a terrorist organization is inadmissible, and therefore ineligible for adjustment 
of status.  8 U.S.C §§ 1182(a)(3)(B)(i)(VII), 1225(a). 
 
2 The ninety-day limit to file a motion to reopen does not apply to motions for asylum 
relief “based on changed country conditions[,]” proven by evidence that is “material and 
was not available and would not have been discovered or presented at the previous 
proceeding.”  8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii).  
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[a family-based visa] after a final administrative decision has been entered is common 
and does not, in itself, constitute an exceptional circumstance” warranting sua sponte 
reopening.  See Chehazeh, 666 F.3d at 128 (“[T]he BIA views its authority to reopen as 
being limited and only available in ‘exceptional situations’ . . . .”).3  Contrary to his 
briefing, this determination addressed the TRIG exemption arguments and is outside our 
jurisdiction to review. 
Paredes’s abuse-of-discretion arguments also fail.  To overcome the time and 
numerical limits for filing his motion to reopen, Paredes needed to demonstrate an 
adverse change in conditions in Peru, 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(7)(C)(ii); 8 C.F.R. 
§ 1003.2(c)(2), which the BIA held he did not.  He asserts that the BIA failed to address 
each argument he raised regarding changed conditions and gave insufficient 
consideration to the evidence. 
The BIA “abuses its discretion when it fails to consider and appraise the 
[arguments and] material evidence before it.”  Shardar v. Att’y Gen., 503 F.3d 308, 315 
(3d Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted); see also Fei Yan Zhu v. 
Att’y Gen., 744 F.3d 268, 272 (3d Cir. 2014) (defining the abuse-of-discretion standard as 
whether “the BIA meaningfully considered the evidence and arguments . . . presented”).  
But while “it may not ignore evidence favorable” to Paredes, it need not “expressly parse 
each point or discuss each piece of evidence presented . . . .”  Fei Yan Zhu, 744 F.3d at 
                                              
3 We further note that even if the BIA had found Paredes’s recent eligibility for 
adjustment of status to be an “exceptional situation,” “the presence of an exceptional 
situation does not compel it to act; the BIA may still decide against reopening.”  Sang 
Goo Park, 846 F.3d at 650. 
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272.  Rather, the BIA must simply “provide an indication that it considered such 
evidence, and if [it] is rejected, an explanation as to why it was rejected.”  Id.; see also 
Filja v. Gonzalez, 447 F.3d 241, 256 (3d Cir. 2006) (The BIA need not “write an exegesis 
on every contention” raised, but “merely . . . consider the issues raised, and announce its 
decision in terms sufficient to enable a reviewing court to perceive that it has heard and 
thought and not merely reacted.”). 
Here, the BIA indicated that it had considered Paredes’s evidence and arguments 
and explained why it found them insufficient.  Citing specific exhibits Paredes included 
in his motion, the BIA found that “the background evidence reflects that Peruvian 
authorities have long combated [the] Shining Path,” and that, “while [it] continues to 
target individuals and the Peruvian military, substantially similar conditions existed at the 
time of [Paredes’s] 2009 hearing.”  Therefore, the BIA was “not persuaded that 
conditions in Peru are materially different with respect to the [Paredes’s] claim for future 
persecution or alleged fear of torture.”  Neither the BIA’s decision nor its reasoning show 
an abuse of discretion. 
We therefore must deny the petition to remand. 
